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DO BANKS INFLUENCE THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE CHOICES OF FIRMS? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates three capital structure decisions – leverage, debt maturity and 
the source of debt – in a simultaneous setting. Moreover, we investigate whether these 
choices are influenced by the involvement of banks in a firm. Our results based on a 
panel of Dutch firms show that bank relationships, measured by interlocking board 
memberships and equity ownership, have a significant impact on the relations among 
the three capital structure choices. First, less bank involvement strengthens the 
positive impact of leverage on maturity. This is consistent with the liquidity risk 
theory, because involved banks help firms to mitigate liquidity risk. Second, bank 
debt negatively effects leverage in firms with bank interlocks, while this relation is 
absent in firms without such bank involvement. This result suggests that banks 
maximize the value of their loans by reducing overall leverage. Third, we find a 
strong trade-off between bank debt and maturity, which is independent of the degree 
of bank involvement. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The involvement of banks in non-financial firms is a large and important area of 
scientific research. A large number of theoretical and empirical studies on firm-bank 
relationships investigate the effects of these relations on bank loans and firm 
performance (see Boot (2000) and Ongena and Smith (2000) for recent reviews). 
Studies on the firm-bank relations show that banks provide many different services to 
firms. Through this multitude of services banks obtain information about the firm, 
which is not available to outsiders. Banks develop relations with firms, based on 
repeated services and their information advantage. On the one hand, bank relations 
may be beneficial to the firms because the bank, as a delegated monitor, bridges 
information problems between borrowers and lenders. On the other hand, banks may 
(ab)use their information advantage and the channels of their relations, for example to 
reduce leverage, because this increases the value of bank debt. 
The most important firm-bank relation is borrowing and lending. Banks as a 
source of debt are studied in several empirical studies (see, e.g., Houston and James 
(1996)). From the perspective of firms, decisions about bank debt are part of the 
capital structure choice, together with the choice of leverage and debt maturity. In a 
wide range of empirical papers leverage is explained from proxies for tax, bankruptcy 
and agency theories (see, e.g., Rajan and Zingales (1995)). Other studies investigate 
the determinants of debt maturity choice (see Barclay and Smith (1995)). Most 
recently, the notion that several capital structure decisions are interdependent has 
emerged in the literature. For example, Barclay et al. (2002) and Johnson (2003) 
study maturity and leverage and Johnson (1997) measures the relation between 
maturity and the source of debt. 
Our study investigates the role of bank involvement in a capital structure 
setting. The question we address is whether bank involvement is related to capital 
structure choices. However, a firm’s capital structure involves a complex set of 
decisions, which at least include the debt-equity choice and choices of the maturity 
and sources of debt. Therefore, in a first instance we simultaneously model these three 
capital structure decisions. This approach contributes to the empirical literature 
because the simultaneous model involves three decisions, while existing studies focus 
on a single decision or, at best, two decisions. The three-decision model is initially 
tested for the full sample of firms. Our main hypothesis, however, is that bank 
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involvement is related to capital structure choices. Therefore, we expect that the 
outcomes of our three-decision model are different for sets of firms with varying 
degree of bank involvement. Next to debt financing, banks have additional channels 
to influence firms. One opportunity is through a bank’s shareholdings in a firm and 
another is through interlocking directorates. In the second part of the paper we explore 
the effects of differing degrees of bank involvement and we divide our sample on the 
basis of non-debt bank influence. We measure bank influence as equity ownership 
and interlocking directorates and we distinguish four groups: no bank involvement, 
banks own equity, banks have interlocks, and banks have both equity and interlocks. 
For each of these groups we estimate our three-equation model and we compare the 
results across sub-samples. This analysis is a contribution to the literature on firm-
bank relations as it describes how bank relations are linked to the firms’ capital 
structure choices. So far, the banking literature has considered the terms of banks 
debt, without investigating other capital structure choices.  
We test the relation between bank involvement and capital structure choices 
for a sample of Dutch firms. The Netherlands provides an excellent arena to study the 
impact of banks on firms, because Dutch banks have a strong position and many 
relations with non-financial firms.1 The concentration of the five largest banks in the 
Netherlands was over 80% in the period between 1998 and 2000, which illustrates the 
power of these five banks (European Central Bank (2002)). Dutch banks also hold 
shares of their customers. However, due to the weak position of shareholders in Dutch 
firms, a sole shareholding of a bank in a firm might not be enough to exercise 
influence over its capital structure. The undeveloped public debt market strengthens 
the position of banks, because alternatives for bank debt are limited. Finally, we 
expect that banks ensure strong positions in firms through a representation on the 
board, i.e. interlocking directorates.2 In several other countries a bank-based system 
prevails, in which large and powerful banks pay a prominent role in the financing of 
firms. For example, the ECB (2002) reports that in Germany loans from Hausbanken, 
                                                           
1 A typical example is Getronics. The large Dutch banks ING and ABN Amro provided loans to this 
computer firm when financial troubles arose. Foreign banks were not eager to help the firm, but the 
many relations of the Dutch banks saved the firm. ING provided loans, owns large amount of preferred 
shares and some common shares, has a vice-chair of the supervisory board who is chair of the 
supervisory board in Getronics, and advises the firm. Most likely ING is a customer and ING’s 
investment funds held convertibles. Not surprisingly, the initial restructuring proposal, advised by ING, 
was at the expense of the regular bondholders and shareholders (Het Financieele Dagblad, February 3, 
2003). 
2 Two observations illustrate the relevance of bank interlocks. The president of the Dutch central bank 
recently mentioned: “We do not argue that a manager of a large firm should never be on the board of 
its house bank. But in case there is a situation where the relation between a bank and a firm develops 
such that conflicting interests arise, yes we pay attention and we have intervened in the past (…) I can 
assure you: we intervened more than once.” (NRC Handelsblad, June 12, 2003). The second 
observation is that Danisevska et al. (2003) report that the presence of bankers on the board is critical 
for removing an underperforming chairman from the managerial board in the Netherlands.  
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which have close relationships with firms, represent the most important external 
financing source.  
We find that the outcomes of the three-equation capital structure model differ 
between sub-samples with different degrees of bank involvement. Thus, bank 
involvement co-determines capital structure choices. These results emphasize the 
importance of firm-bank relationships in capital structure choices. We find strong 
indications that bank influence in the Netherlands goes beyond providing debt. For 
example, firms with bank interlocks exhibit a negative effect of bank debt on 
leverage, while this relation is absent in firms without this bank involvement. The 
result suggests that banks maximize the value of their loans by reducing overall 
leverage, which is consistent with the preference of banks for low risk customers 
(Carey et al. (1998)). Further, we find that the absence of bank relations increases the 
positive effect of leverage on maturity, which is consistent with Diamond’s (1991) 
liquidity risk theory. The results indicate that banks mitigate liquidity risk. The 
findings in this study illuminate the importance of our set-up because banks appear to 
influence capital structure choices through other channels than bank debt. Finally, we 
find a strong trade-off between bank debt and maturity, which is independent of the 
degree of bank involvement. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe 
the theoretical model and we define our hypotheses. Section 3 contains the description 
of the sample and the definitions. The full-sample results for the model are in Section 
4, while in Section 5 we investigate the role of bank involvement. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Model, theory and hypotheses 
 
This paper investigates the role of banks in capital structure decisions of firms. 
Consequently, we first need to construct a model for a firm’s capital structure choice, 
before we can incorporate the role of banks. However, capital structure choice is a 
complex issue involving multiple decisions. In order to have a sufficiently broad 
perspective on capital structure, we model leverage, debt maturity and the source of 
debt. In this section we first define a general empirical model for these three capital 
structure choices and their determinants (2.1). We state explicit hypotheses based on a 
set of theories: tax effects and bankruptcy costs (2.2), moral hazard (2.3), adverse 
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selection (2.4) and specialization in the lending market (2.5). This is a necessary 
foundation for our later refinements on the role of banks in capital structure choice. 
The section ends with a review of empirical studies about relations among capital 
structure decisions (2.6). 
 
2.1 A general model for three capital structure choices 
Theoretical models propose a wide variety of determinants of leverage (LEV), debt 
maturity (DEBMAT) and source of debt (BANKD). Moreover, theory also suggests 
that the three choices might be determined jointly. The transformation of theory into 
an empirical model requires three, partly overlapping, sets of exogenous variables 
affecting the three endogenous variables. We denote the vector containing these 
variables by x1, x2, and x3, respectively. We consider the following structural form of 
the simultaneous equations model: 
 
ititititit BANKDDEBMATxLEV ,113121
/
,1 εγγβ +++=  
ititititit BANKDLEVxDEBMAT ,223212
/
,2 εγγβ +++=   (1) 
ititititit DEBMATLEVxBANKD ,332313
/
,3 εγγβ +++= , 
 
where i indexes firms, and t indexes years. As we model three capital structure 
choices, our model contains a large set of explanatory variables. Identification of the 
three individual equations requires that the sets of variables included in each equation 
are “sufficiently different.” That is, exclusion restrictions should hold for each 
equation such that sufficient instruments can be obtained within the system to 
estimate the parameters of interest. Therefore, in the remainder of this section we 
review theoretical models concerning leverage, debt maturity and bank debt decisions, 
and discuss the corresponding explanatory variables. We focus on the most relevant 
theories modeling the relations between the above-mentioned capital structure 
choices. An overview of theories, determinants and the hypothesized effects is 
provided in Table 1.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
2.2 Tax effects and bankruptcy costs 
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The optimal leverage of a firm is determined by a trade-off between benefits and costs 
of debt. The tax advantage of debt depends on the tax deductibility of interest 
payments and is positively related to the firm’s marginal tax rate (Modigliani and 
Miller (1963)) (see hypothesis L1 in Table 1). DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) show 
that this advantage of debt can be crowded out by alternative non-debt tax shields, 
such as depreciation or investment tax credits (L2). The optimal debt ratio is also 
negatively related to the expected bankruptcy costs, which decrease with a firm’s 
collateral value of assets (L3) and increase with the probability of bankruptcy (L4).  
The next set of models reveals the complexity of relationships between 
leverage, debt maturity and some determinants of optimal leverage. Brick and Ravid 
(1985) keep leverage constant and model the effects of the term structure of interest 
rates on optimal debt maturity in the presence of taxes. When the term structure of 
interest rates is upward sloping, it is optimal to choose long-term debt because the 
present value of the tax shelter will be highest (M1 and M2a).3 Lewis (1990) on the 
other hand determines leverage and debt maturity simultaneously and derives that 
taxes are irrelevant for the debt maturity decision (M2b). Kane, Marcus and 
McDonald (1985) extend the tax-bankruptcy trade off by considering the costs of 
issuing debt. In this framework the tax advantage of debt is positively related to 
leverage (L1), but negatively affects debt maturity (M2a), because the decrease in the 
tax advantage of debt requires longer debt maturity in order to amortize floatation 
costs. Further, debt maturity will optimally decrease with increasing asset value 
volatility due to a higher probability of bankruptcy and the need to rebalance the 
capital structure more frequently (M3a). Wiggins (1990) finds a positive effect of 
asset risk on debt maturity in a model without transaction costs, treating tax shelters in 
case of default in a different way than Kane et al. (1985) (M3b). 
Based on these theories we expect for leverage a positive relation with the 
marginal tax rate and the collateral value of assets and a negative relation with non-
debt tax shields and the probability of bankruptcy. Debt maturity should be positively 
related to the term structure of interest rates, while the effects of the marginal tax rate 
and asset risk remain ambiguous. These theories do not provide clear predictions 
concerning the relationship between debt maturity and leverage.  
 
                                                           
3 Later, interest rate uncertainty is introduced, resulting in long-term debt being optimal also for flat or 
even decreasing term structures (Brick and Ravid (1991)). 
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2.3 Moral hazard 
Moral hazard problems between stakeholders lead to agency costs of debt and equity. 
The choice of the level and type of debt can influence agency problems. 
Overinvestment is the problem that managers of firms with low growth opportunities 
tend to allocate free cash flows to projects with negative net present value (Jensen 
(1986)). In this situation debt plays a positive role by forcing managers to pay out free 
cash flows on fixed debt obligations. Debt reduces free cash flow directly and an 
additional effect is the disciplining through the threat of bankruptcy in case of bad 
investments (L5).  
High leverage can lead to the rejection of positive net present value projects for 
firms with ample growth opportunities (Myers (1977)). Shortening debt maturity (the 
debt matures before the investment option is exercised) is a way to reduce this 
underinvestment problem. Myers also derives a motive for matching the maturities of 
a firm’s assets and liabilities: the value of short-term debt is less sensitive to shifts in 
the variation of the project’s cash flows than long-term debt. Barnea et al. (1980) 
argue that this property of short-term debt eliminates the incentives of shareholders to 
increase their payoffs by increasing the project risk - the asset substitution problem. 
Therefore, we expect a negative relationship between a firm’s growth opportunities 
with both leverage (L6) and debt maturity (M4). Another empirical implication is a 
negative relationship between leverage and debt maturity (L7a and M6a). Finally, the 
maturity of assets is expected to positively affect debt maturity (M5).  
Adjustments in the debt ratios and maturities are not the only remedies for 
moral hazard problems. There is a vast literature exploring the role of banks in 
contracting, monitoring and providing proper incentive structures to borrowers that 
are expected to be susceptible to underinvestment and asset substitution problems. 
Myers (1977) describes the benefits of monitoring by the lender and the possibility to 
renegotiate the contract for the reduction of sub-optimal investment decisions (L8a). 
Delegated monitoring by a financial intermediary has lower monitoring costs as 
opposed to a group of individual borrowers and avoids the free rider problem 
(Diamond (1984)). However, according to Rajan and Winton (1995) banks have a 
natural preference for providing short-term loans as their liabilities contain a 
significant proportion of short-term liquid deposits (B3 and M7a). Smith and Warner 
(1979) describe the role of private debt with covenants in decreasing the agency costs 
of debt. Finally, according to Diamond (1991b) bank monitoring has two purposes: 
 8
screening serves to eliminate borrowers with risky projects and to provide incentives 
to engage in safe projects. Therefore we expect that firms with high growth 
opportunities and high leverage, which are more likely to face shareholder-
bondholder conflicts, have a higher proportion of bank debt in their capital structure 
(B1a and B2a). Accordingly, we expect bank debt to have shorter maturities.   
While the benefits of debt provided by banks are well documented, the 
disadvantages of close bank relationships are less clear. Rajan (1992) suggests that the 
benefits of bank monitoring can be lost when the bank creates information 
monopolies. Borrowers with large information asymmetries might find themselves 
unable to switch the lender can face excessive rent extraction and incentive distortion, 
unless they possess a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis the bank. Gaining access to 
the public debt market can also eliminate the bank’s information monopoly. The 
empirical implication is that borrowers with high growth opportunities and a weak 
bargaining position (e.g. due to bank shareholdings or no access to public debt 
market) will rely less on bank debt (B1b and B5).  
 
2.4 Adverse selection 
The central theme of adverse selection models is the presence of information 
asymmetry between parties prior to contracting, which is costly because the actual 
price differs from the price under equal information. In capital structure theory, 
asymmetric information is reflected in the superior information that a firm’s 
management has as opposed to their lenders. Flannery (1986) and Kale and Noe  
(1990) describe how firms with favorable private information can signal this news by 
issuing short-term debt (M8). However, according to Diamond (1991a) issuing short-
term debt increases the liquidity risk, i.e. the risk of sub-optimal liquidation when 
lenders refuse to refinance illiquid, though solvent borrowers.4 Johnson (2003) argues 
that increasing liquidity risk by issuing short-term debt can be compared to increasing 
expected bankruptcy costs, which have a negative effect on optimal leverage (L7b and 
M6b). This effect is likely to be stronger for firms that have limited possibility to 
issue long-term debt such as firms without access to public debt market or firms 
without close bank relationships. Diamond (1991a) further predicts that the trade off 
between benefits and costs of short-term debt will result in a nonlinear relationship 
                                                           
4 The excessive incentive of lenders to liquidate borrowers is caused by their inability to recognize and 
accrue all the future control rents that are assigned to borrowers in a state without liquidation. 
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between the firm’s debt maturity and its credit quality. The firms with the best and 
worst rating issue short-term debt, while other debtors borrow long-term funds (M9).  
Several studies argue that private lenders have an information advantage about 
borrowers in comparison with public bondholders.5 Firms with large information 
asymmetries are thus expected to obtain loans from banks in order to decrease adverse 
selection costs of debt (B4). Fama (1985) suggests that the closeness of the 
relationship between the bank and its customer and the additional information that the 
bank is able to collect about the firm from its current/deposit accounts is especially 
valuable in providing short-term loans (M7b and B3).  
 
2.5 Specialization in corporate lending market 
Several models derive that firms with low credit quality or a higher probability of 
financial distress seek to obtain debt monitoring by banks (B6 and B7) (see Berlin and 
Loeys (1988), Berlin and Mester (1992) and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994)). 
Public debt is less beneficial for this type of borrowers as it does not allow easy 
renegotiation, and liquidation decisions are not likely to be efficient. Furthermore, in 
Berlin and Loeys (1988), firms face a choice between unmonitored loans with 
covenants (public debt) and monitored loans (bank debt). They argue that firms with 
high proportions of intangible or firm-specific assets cannot benefit from close 
monitoring, because even early liquidation will raise only low liquidation values (B8). 
In addition, firms whose interim financial indicators provide noisy signals about their 
credit health attach a high value to the option to renegotiate the debt provided by 
banks (B9). Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) emphasize the ambition of banks to 
develop a reputation for being financially flexible, i.e. making the correct 
renegotiation versus liquidation choice. This desire gives banks an incentive to 
commit more funds to the evaluation of borrowers in financial distress. Firms with 
higher probabilities of distress thus have a preference for bank debt over public debt, 
in contrast to less risky firms that do not wish to be pooled with such borrowers.  
However, in the empirical study of Carey et al. (1998) the banks’ reputation (or 
regulation) effect leads to a specialization in providing funds to low-risk customers. 
They find that both banks and other private lenders supply loans to firms with 
unobservable ex-ante risk. The distinction between the two types of lenders arises 
                                                           
5 See, e.g. Leland and Pyle (1977), Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), Fama (1985) and Boyd and 
Prescott (1986). 
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when the observable risks of borrowers (such as leverage) are considered. Banks have 
two reasons for their preference to lend to firms with low leverage (B2b). First, 
regulation of banks relates capital requirements to the risk of their assets and thus 
motivates banks to provide loans to relatively safe borrowers. Second, banks wish to 
develop a reputation for being reasonable when the terms of the contract must be 
renegotiated. Being known for not using these situations to extract maximum rents is 
a valuable asset for banks, which can be lost in case frequent liquidations of 
borrowers are observed. Therefore, we expect a positive effect of a firm’s liquidation 
value and the probability of financial distress on the proportion of bank debt in the 
capital structure. However, the relationship between the observable risks, credit 
quality and the precision of interim indications and the bank debt preference is likely 
to be negative.  
Finally, Blackwell and Kidwell (1988) compare transaction costs of public and 
private debt issues, which include flotation, agency and searching costs, and conclude 
that a firm selects the debt market that minimises these costs. Flotation costs of public 
debt issues have a large fixed part that makes private debt preferable for small firms 
or firms with small average debt issue volume (B10). 
 
2.6 Prior empirical evidence 
While this study simultaneously analyses three capital structure decisions and their 
interactions, empirical models in the current literature incorporate up to two decisions. 
A substantial number of papers investigate the relationship between leverage and debt 
maturity, while a small number of studies examine maturity and the source of debt. 
Finally, several papers consider leverage and the source of debt simultaneously. 
There are several empirical studies exploring the link between debt maturity 
and leverage. Barclay and Smith (1995) find a positive correlation between leverage 
and debt maturity. Stohs and Mauer (1996) explain the positive coefficient for 
leverage in their debt maturity equation by Diamond’s (1991) liquidity risk effects of 
short-term debt. A similar conclusion is drawn in Antoniou et al. (2002) for the UK, 
Germany and France. In recent papers, such as Barclay et al. (2003) and Johnson 
(2003), simultaneous equations for leverage and maturity are modeled. Barclay et al. 
(2003) find a negative effect of leverage on debt maturity and a positive effect of debt 
maturity on leverage. While the first result is attributed to the substitution of leverage 
and debt maturity in mitigating moral hazard problems, the latter is mentioned to be 
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puzzling. The main question of Johnson (2003) is whether short-term debt alleviates 
the negative effect of growth opportunities on leverage. Johnson reports a mutually 
positive relationship between leverage and debt maturity, which is again explained by 
the liquidity risk impact of short-term debt on leverage.  
Two studies have analyzed the relation between maturity and the source of 
debt. Johnson (1997) reports that the estimated coefficients of the determinants of the 
ratio of long-term bank debt to total long-term debt remain unchanged when the same 
determinants are used to explain residuals from regression of long-term bank debt on 
total long-term debt. Denis and Mihov (2003) estimate a two-stage model where first 
the maturity of new debt issues is predicted. The predicted value is then used as an 
explanatory variable in a logit analysis of debt source. Although the first-stage 
regression has substantial explanatory power, predicted maturity in the second stage 
does not appear to affect the source of debt. Thus, the scarce empirical evidence 
favors the independence of the two capital structure decisions. 
The empirical literature on the relationship between the source of debt and 
leverage mainly focuses on the determinants of the lender identity (bank, private non-
bank or public) in case of new loans. The only exception is Johnson (1997), who 
analyzes the effects of firm characteristics on the corporate debt ownership structure. 
He finds that leverage is positively related to the proportion of bank debt in firms’ 
debt structure and argued that this is consistent with the demand of highly leveraged 
firms for close monitoring by banks. The results for the effects of leverage on the 
marginal lender choice are limited and inconclusive. Carey et al. (1998) show that 
banks specialize in loans for firms with low observable risk, as proxied by leverage. 
The evidence of Denis and Mihov (2003) on the other hand does not find any impact 
of leverage on the choice between bank and private non-bank debt. The probability of 
issuing public debt is however positively related to leverage. Finally, in Hadlock and 
James (2002) the likelihood of a bank loan announcement is positively related to 
leverage.  
 
3. Sample and definitions 
 
Our sample consists of all non-financial firms listed for at least one full calendar year 
on the Amsterdam Exchanges during the ten-year period between 1992 and 2001. We 
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eliminate firm-years with missing observations for any of the variables defined in this 
section. The final sample thus includes 205 firms and 1205 firm-year observations.  
This analysis combines three data sources. First, balance sheet, profit and loss 
account, and some stock market related data are obtained from the Reach database. 
Second, the Gids bij de Officiële Prijscourant van de Amsterdamse Effectenbeurs (an 
annual overview of securities listed at the Amsterdam Exchanges) reports publicly-
listed debt instruments. Third, ownership structure data is obtained from the leading 
Dutch financial newspaper, Het Financieele Dagblad. Their list of owners of 
exchange-listed firms is formed according to the compulsory notifications for Wet 
Melding Zeggenschap (the Law on disclosure of shareholdings).  
The main aim of this study is an empirical analysis of the simultaneous 
relationships among three capital structure decisions. A firm’s capital structure is 
described by its leverage, which we define as total debt over the book value of total 
assets. Firms can obtain debt in a variety of forms, maturities, priority structures, from 
different sources and with various covenants. Although these are all important 
characteristics of debt that our investigation should ideally address, we limit ourselves 
to two of them, mainly due to data availability. First, debt maturity, which we 
measure as the ratio of long-term debt to total debt. Long-term debt is debt that 
matures in a period longer than one year.6 Second, we are interested in the source of 
debt. The empirical literature makes a broad distinction between three debt providers 
– investors in public debt issues, banks and other non-depository financial 
institutions.7  We define bank debt as the ratio of both short and long-term bank debt 
to total debt. While the Reach database enables us to precisely identify the amount of 
bank debt, it is impossible to make an accurate distinction between the other two debt 
providers.8  
In addition to the capital structure measures, our model includes several 
explanatory variables. We proxy the marginal tax rate by the ratio of taxes paid to 
                                                           
6 The one-year cut-off between short and long-term debt reflects the accounting definition used in 
balance sheets, which are our source of data. Alternatively, Stohs and Mauer (1996) construct a 
weighted average maturity of all firm’s liabilities. Even after consulting firms’ annual reports we were 
not able to obtain data for a similar measure of debt maturity. 
7 See, e.g. Carey et al. (1998), Johnson (1997), Denis and Mihov (2003). 
8 Gids bij de Officiële Prijscourant annually publishes a list of firms with outstanding public debt and 
its characteristics. There are two reasons why we prefer to refrain from using the amounts of debt listed 
in this overview as a measure of outstanding public debt for our purposes. Firstly and most importantly, 
the date of collection of information by the Gids does not match the balance sheet dates. Secondly, 
accounting procedures for bookkeeping of debt may cause that the amount on the balance sheet does 
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pretax income. Titman and Wessels (1988) define non-debt tax shields as operating 
income less interest and taxes paid over the corporate tax rate, relative to the book 
value of total assets. We use fixed tangible assets and inventory scaled by total assets 
as a proxy for collateral value of assets. It is likely that this measure is also related to 
the firm’s liquidation value. The standard deviation of the return on assets, measured 
over the preceding five-year period, approximates the asset value volatility. Further 
the volatility of asset returns is often used as a proxy for the probability of 
bankruptcy. Next to it, we expect this volatility to be negatively related to the 
informativeness of the interim financial ratios, as for firms with volatile returns these 
indicators are likely to provide noisy signals about their credit health. We include 
Tobin’s Q as a proxy for a firm’s growth opportunities. Tobin’s Q is the market value 
of the firm divided by the replacement value of the assets.9 Free cash flows are 
defined as a ratio of operating income, minus taxes, interest expenditures, and 
dividends, over total assets (Lehn and Poulsen (1989)).  
To measure the term premium for a given year, we follow Barclay and Smith 
(1995) by using the difference between the monthly yield on 10-year government 
bonds and the monthly interbank 6-month rate (there are no short-term government 
bonds in the Netherlands). To test the hypothesis that firms match the maturity of 
assets and liabilities, we estimate asset maturity similar to Stohs and Mauer (1996) as 
the book value weighted average of the maturities of current assets and net property, 
plant and equipment. The maturity of current assets is calculated as the ratio of 
current assets to cost of goods sold. In estimating of the maturity of net property, plant 
and equipment we assume straight-line depreciation and calculate a ratio of net 
property, plant and equipment to annual depreciation expense. We use future 
abnormal earnings, defined as earnings per share in year t+1 less earnings per share in 
year t divided by the end of year t share price, as a proxy for the insiders’ private 
knowledge, similar to, e.g., Barclay and Smith (1995) and Stohs and Mauer (1996)). 
Diamond (1991a) predicts a non-linear relationship between the firm’s credit rating 
and debt maturity. Given the lack of credit ratings for a large number of firms in our 
sample we follow Johnson (2003) and proxy liquidity risk by a measure of firm size 
(book value of total assets) and its square.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
not equal the outstanding amount published by the Gids. The limited disclosure of debt providers other 
than banks in annual reports does not help to solve this issue either. 
9 We estimate the replacement value as described in Perfect and Wiles (1994). See De Jong (2002, p. 
39) for a discussion of estimating the replacement value of assets of Dutch firms. 
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Borrowers with information problems are likely to be small firms, as defined by 
the asset size, and firms with growth opportunities (Carey et al. (1998), Johnson 
(1997)). The extent of the hold-up problem (Rajan (1992)) that the informational 
problematic borrowers face should also depend on their bargaining power vis-à-vis 
the bank. The extent of a firm’s reliance on a single bank is hypothesized to depend 
on whether the firm has multiple bank relationships or excess to the public debt 
market. The lack of access to the public debt market is measured by a dummy 
variable, which equals one for firms without outstanding public debt and zero 
otherwise. Furthermore, we have information on two potential proxies that are likely 
to be negatively related to the firm’s bargaining position. First is the equity stakes of 
banks in the firm and second, a dummy variable that equals one if there is a banker on 
the firm’s supervisory (i.e. non-executive) board. Finally, we use profitability, defined 
as the ratio of operating income to total assets, as a measure of credit quality that we 
expect to be negatively related to the demand for bank debt.  
In Table 2 we present summary statistics for our sample of Dutch listed firms in 
the period between 1992 and 2001. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
The capital structure of the firms shows that on average the assets are financed with 
25.8% of debt. The average firm has 57.2% of its total debt maturing in more than one 
year and 58.6% of the debt is provided by banks. Almost a quarter (24.1%) of the 
firms have outstanding public debt. Less than half of the firms (41%) have at least one 
banker on the supervisory board and there is on average less than one banker on the 
board. The bank shareholdings are on average 7.4%. 
 
4. Results: the capital structure choices model 
 
This section presents the results of our three-equation model explaining leverage, debt 
maturity and bank debt. We test the hypotheses from Table 1 with model (1). Because 
our model contains endogenous explanatory variables, applying ordinary least squares 
to estimate the coefficients of this model would generate biased and inconsistent 
estimators. Therefore, we use the instrumental variable approach, where the list of 
predetermined variables (instruments) is based on the reduced-form solution of the 
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structural model. The model is estimated by applying two-stage least squares with 
Newey-West heteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation-consistent standard errors. Table 
3 presents the results of the simultaneous equations model with the three endogenous 
variables, i.e. leverage, debt maturity, and bank debt. Figure 1 provides an overview 
of the estimated relationships among leverage, debt maturity and bank debt.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
First we focus on the discussion of the results concerning the relationships among the 
three capital structure characteristics. In the leverage equation, debt maturity and bank 
debt have significantly negative coefficients of -0.544, and -0.408 respectively, at the 
5% significance level. The coefficients of leverage and bank debt in the debt maturity 
equations are both significant at the 1% level. While leverage has a positive effect on 
the debt maturity, bank debt is negatively related to the debt maturity. Finally, in the 
bank debt equation we find that the coefficient of leverage is not significantly 
different from zero and debt maturity has a significantly negative impact (-0.736) on 
bank debt. These results suggest that leverage has a positive impact on the debt 
maturity, while debt maturity negatively affects leverage. The former finding is 
consistent with Diamond (1991a) where firms with high leverage optimally issue 
long-term debt in order to avoid sub-optimal liquidations (M6b). The positive effect 
of leverage on debt maturity is also documented in the empirical literature.10 The 
significantly negative coefficient of debt maturity in the leverage equation implies 
that decreasing the debt maturity increases optimal leverage, which is consistent with 
Myers’ (1977) mitigation of underinvestment problems by shortening debt maturity 
(L7a).11  
The negative relationship between debt maturity and the ratio of bank debt is 
consistent with the specialization of banks in providing short-term loans (M7a,b and 
                                                           
10 Stohs and Mauer (1996), Antoniou et al. (2002), and Johnson (2003) report a positive significant 
coefficient of leverage in the debt maturity equation. Barclay and Smith (1995) find a positive 
correlation between leverage and debt maturity. 
11 While the hypotheses L7a and M6b are confirmed, it implies a rejection of Diamond’s (1991a) 
liquidity risk story in the leverage equation (L7b) and Myers’ (1977) underinvestment problem 
mitigation in the debt maturity equation (M6a). The inability to fully support one of the two theories 
and the two competing signs in the relationship between leverage and debt maturity might be also 
contributed to a misspecification of our model. See a similar problem in Barclay et al. (2003). We 
explore this possibility and provide some reconciliation in the next section.  
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B3).12 Firms demanding short-term debt are likely to be satisfied by banks that have 
the informational advantage necessary for providing this type of debt in comparison to 
other alternative sources of debt (Fama (1985)). Also according to Rajan and Winton 
(1995), banks have a natural preference for providing short-term loans in order to 
match the maturity of their assets with liabilities, which contain a significant 
proportion of deposits on demand.13  
Finally, the significantly negative effect of bank debt on leverage confirms the 
prediction of Carey et al. (1998) that banks prefer to provide loans to low risk 
borrowers either for reputational or regulatory reasons (L8b).14 The negative impact 
of bank debt on leverage and insignificant effect of leverage on bank debt are not 
consistent with the hypothesized role of banks in the mitigation of moral hazard 
problems (L8a and B2a). The summary statistics in Table 1 revealed that banks, 
besides being important debt providers to listed Dutch firms, also hold positions on 
the supervisory boards and own equity stakes in the firms. These additional channels 
of influence might provide banks with easier ways to control debt policies of their 
borrowers. In the next section we set out to explore this idea in more depth.  
The results for the control variables in the leverage equation in Table 3 provide 
mixed evidence for the tax and bankruptcy hypotheses. The coefficient of collateral is 
significantly positive suggesting that firms with lower bankruptcy costs have higher 
leverage (L3). We also find evidence for the crowding-out of tax advantages of debt 
by non-debt tax shields (L2). The non-debt tax shields proxy has a significantly (at the 
1% level) negative impact on leverage. However, the negative sign on the taxation 
measure is opposite to the prediction (L1). Furthermore, asset volatility, 
approximating the probability of bankruptcy, does not appear to influence leverage 
(L4). Next, we focus on the variables controlling for potential moral hazard problems. 
We find no evidence that a firm’s growth opportunities have impact on its leverage as 
the coefficient of Tobin’s Q is not significantly different from zero (L6). On the other 
hand, free cash flows have a significantly positive coefficient. This is consistent with 
                                                           
12 This result might be partially driven by an institutional feature, as Dutch firms do not issue public 
debt with maturities under one year. However, public debt use is relatively small.  
13 An interview in the Dutch financial press supports this conclusion. The chief syndicated loans at 
ABN Amro, mentioned so-called bridge loans that are provided by banks. For banks large long-term 
loans are unattractive due to the low interest rates and banks do not have to maintain required capital. 
In case firms need fast financing, for example because of an acquisition, banks provide a loan that has 
to be repaid within a year (Het Financieele Dagblad, January 26, 2000). 
14 However, the statistically insignificant coefficient of leverage in the debt maturity equation suggest 
that this effect is not reciprocal as we do not find that firm with lower leverage have more bank debt 
(rejection of B2b). 
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Jensen’s (1986) overinvestment problem, where in the presence of free cash flow debt 
plays a disciplinary role (L5). Firm size does not appear to have a significant impact 
on leverage.  
Similar to all studies exploring the determinants of debt maturity, we find strong 
evidence that firms match the maturity of their assets with the liabilities (M5).15 The 
coefficient on the proxy for the asset maturity is positive and significant at the 1% 
level. Our results provide only limited support for the taxation and bankruptcy 
hypotheses. The insignificant coefficient on taxation suggests that taxes do not affect 
optimal debt maturity (M2b) as predicted by Lewis (1990).16 The coefficients on asset 
volatility (M3), and term premium (M1) are not significantly different from zero. Like 
in the leverage equation, the proxy for growth opportunities has no significant impact 
on debt maturity suggesting that debt maturity does not serve to mitigate moral hazard 
problems (M4). The statistically insignificant proxies for credit quality (firm size and 
its square) provide no evidence on Diamond’s (1991a) prediction that both the best 
and the worst creditors rely on short-term debt (M9). Finally, firms in our sample do 
not seem to signal favorable private news by shortening their debt maturity given the 
insignificant measure of abnormal future earnings (M8).17  
In the equation explaining the proportion of bank debt in a firm’s capital 
structure we find a significantly positive effect of the collateral. This result suggests 
that banks prefer to extend loans to borrowers that are able to provide collateral to 
secure the bank debt. According to Berlin and Loeys (1988), firms with higher 
liquidation values benefit from borrowing from banks that ensure efficient liquidation 
(B8). On the other hand, we find no support for their hypothesis that firms with noisy 
interim indicators (B9) or higher probability of financial distress (B7), as proxied by 
the asset value volatility, or firms with low credit quality (B6) rely more on bank debt. 
The statistically insignificant coefficients on firm size (B4) and growth opportunities 
(B1a) do not confirm the expectation that bank debt decreases costs of informational 
problematic borrowers. 18 However, we also do not find any evidence that firms with 
                                                           
15 See, e.g. Barclay and Smith (1995), Stohs and Mauer (1996), Barclay et al. (2003), and Johnson 
(2003). 
16 The estimated coefficient on marginal tax rate in the debt maturity equation does not suggest that that 
the tax advantage of debt negatively effect debt maturity (M2a). 
17 Because theory suggests that signaling requires both positive private news and information 
asymmetry between the lender and the borrower, as a robustness check we have interacted the 
abnormal future earnings with some potential proxies of asymmetric information (such as firm size and 
dummy for a presence of the banker on the board), but the result remained qualitatively unchanged. 
18 The insignificant coefficient on firm size also does not provide support for the B10 hypothesis that 
the larger fixed part of public debt flotation costs makes bank debt more preferable for small firms.  
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high growth opportunities and weak bargaining power rely less on bank debt in order 
to avoid potential hold up problem (Rajan (1992)) (B1b and B5). All interactions 
between the growth dummy, which equals one if a firm’s Q is above the sample year 
median and zero otherwise, and three proxies for the firm’s strength vis-à-vis the bank 
yield insignificant results. The dummy approximating the lack of public debt market 
access is significantly positive and shows that firms without access to the public debt 
market rely significantly more on bank debt than other firms even after controlling for 
leverage. Finally, the stand-alone measures for the presence of a banker on the board 
and bank shareholdings are included in the bank-debt equation to diagnose whether 
firms with close relationships with banks have easier access to the bank. This 
hypothesis is rejected. The coefficient on bank shareholding is not significantly 
different from zero and the presence of a banker on the board even has a negative 
impact on the proportion of bank debt in a firm’s capital structure.  
In the model of this, section bankers on the board and bank shareholdings were 
included as explanatory variables for bank debt. However, as argued before, bank 
involvement through boards and equity holdings may go beyond influencing bank 
debt. In the next section we explore the effects of differing bank involvement in the 
firm on its capital structure. 
 
5. Results: the role of banks in the capital structure choices 
 
We begin the analysis of the role of banks in firms’ financing choices by splitting our 
sample into four sub-samples. These sub-samples differ in the potential influence that 
a bank has over the firm’s decision making besides providing debt financing. In 
particular, the distinction between the sub-samples is made according to the presence 
of bank shareholding and representation on the supervisory board. The first group 
consists of firm-years when the firm has no banker on the board and no banks among 
its shareholders. We refer to this group containing 358 firm-year observations as NOB 
(no-bank) group. In the second group, there are also no bankers on the board, but the 
bank shareholding is non-zero. We call this group (351 firm-years) the BEQ (bank 
equity) group. Firms in the third group have a bank representative on the board, but 
there are no bank shareholders. We name this group BOB (banker on the board) group 
and it has 192 firm-years. Finally, the fourth sub-sample consists of firms with both 
bank shareholding and banker on the board. This sub-sample with 304 observations is 
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labeled as BOBEQ (banker on the board and equity). Table 4 provides comparison of 
the average firm characteristics for the four sub-samples.  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
The results of the equality of mean tests among the four groups presented in Table 4 
reveal significant differences in their capital structures and other firm characteristics. 
The average NOB firm has a leverage, debt maturity and a bank debt ratio that is 
relatively close to the overall sample means (see Table 2). For this sub-sample it is 
typical that it includes small, growth firms with volatile asset returns and a lack of 
public debt financing. The BEQ group is characterized by the highest leverage (0.295) 
and reliance on bank debt (73% of total debt) and the lowest overall debt maturity. 
The only resemblance between BEQ and NOB firms lies in their small size and 
limited public debt issuance. Otherwise, BEQ firms have a high proportion of tangible 
assets (0.590) in their capital structure and low growth opportunities, suggesting that 
they are involved in capital-intensive operations. Firms with a banker on the board 
and without bank shareholdings (BOB) are described by the lowest indebtedness 
(0.217) and lowest proportion of bank debt (43% of the total debt). The fact that over 
60% of their debt has maturity longer than one year is likely to be contributed to their 
higher reliance on public debt (about a quarter of the firms). While it is not surprising 
that these are large firms, their average Tobin’s Q of 1.616 is also among the highest 
in our sample. The reported means for the fourth sub-sample (BOBEQ) with firms 
with maximum bank involvement reveal that these firms are very similar to BOB 
firms in terms of their capital structure characteristics and size. Nevertheless, the 
BOBEQ sub-sample contains the most mature firms given the additional evidence of 
lowest asset value volatility (0.021) and low future growth opportunities (1.343).19  
In the remainder of this section we explore to what extent the relationships 
between leverage, maturity and the source of debt are influenced by the strength of 
the ties with banks. To do so, we re-estimate the system of equations in model (1), 
while we allow the γ’s to vary with the individual sub-samples. As a first step, we 
estimate a separate specification for each sub-sample. Next, for each characteristic we 
                                                           
19 In an unreported comparison of bank debt maturity (long-term bank debt over total bank debt) among 
the four groups, we find that bank debt of BOB and BOBEQ firms is almost exclusively short-term 
(median of 0 and 0.107, respectively) in comparison to NOB and BEQ groups (median of 0.370 and 
0.333, respectively). 
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perform a Wald-test on the hypothesis that the impact of a particular variable is 
identical across the four sub-samples. In each case that the null hypothesis of 
parameter homogeneity is not rejected at the 10% significance level, we impose that 
the four sub-samples have identical coefficients for the corresponding explanatory 
variable.20 This way, we prevent ending up with a specification with a large number 
of relatively inaccurately estimated coefficients. The result of this exercise is a 
simultaneous equations model where a subset of the coefficients, including those for 
the endogenous variables and excluding year and industry dummies, varies across 
sub-samples. In estimation, all instruments were interacted with dummies indicating 
sub-samples, which is consistent with an unrestricted specification for the reduced 
form equations.  
Table 5 shows the estimation results of the system of equations, taking into 
account the different ties with banks among the four sub-samples. In Panel A we 
report the coefficients and t-values for our three endogenous variables. For the sake of 
clarity we also present the estimated relationships graphically in Figure 2. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
In general, the links among the capital structure characteristics remain fairly similar to 
those revealed in Table 3 and Figure 1. Nevertheless, controlling for the different 
types of bank involvement provides interesting additional insights. First, the results 
provide a clearer picture on the relationships between leverage and debt maturity. The 
coefficient on leverage in the debt maturity equation is the largest (with a value of 
0.709) and significant at the 1% level for firms that lack close relationships with 
banks. With an increasing degree of bank involvement, the value of the coefficient 
steadily decreases. The debt maturity for the sub-sample of firms with strongest bank 
ties does not depend on leverage. The positive effect of leverage on debt maturity is 
consistent with the hypothesis that short-term debt increases liquidity risk, because 
firms with high leverage issue long-term debt to avoid sub-optimal liquidation 
(Diamond (1991a)) (M6b). Johnson (2003) suggests that this effect is the strongest for 
firms with low credit quality and limited possibility to obtain long-term debt. This is 
                                                           
20 Estimation results for the four sub-samples, and the results of the Wald-tests for parameter 
homogeneity are available from the authors upon request.  
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consistent with the different effects that leverage has on debt maturity in our sample 
in Figure 2. NOB and BEQ firms are rather small firms, largely dependent on bank 
debt financing, which tends to be short term. Therefore, firms with higher leverage 
should have more long-term debt as additional short-term debt would increase the 
likelihood of sub-optimal liquidation and the lack of close bank and public debt 
market relationships limits the possibility to promptly adjust the maturity structure of 
debt if needed. Although the other two groups of firms (BOB and BOBEQ) are 
probably higher quality borrowers, as they are more mature larger firms with less 
volatile returns, only about a quarter of them has access to the public debt market, 
which provides long term debt. In these groups the effects of leverage on debt 
maturity are less positive, because if liquidity risk becomes relevant the access to the 
debt market or the strong link to the bank enables the firm to easily extend its debt 
maturity structure.  
Our results do not provide any evidence that the choice of debt maturity has 
influence on the leverage decision (L7), as the coefficient on debt maturity in the 
leverage equation is not significantly different from zero for any of the sub-samples. 
The overall results strongly suggest that firms (excluding firms with the closest bonds 
to banks) first determine their total debt level and subsequently optimize the maturity 
of the debt. The lack of easy access to various debt sources results in a positive impact 
of leverage on debt maturity, because short-term debt as opposed to long-term debt 
raises the likelihood of premature liquidation for firms with high leverage.  
Another interesting result concerns the effects of bank debt on leverage. For the 
overall sample, we observe a significantly negative impact. A more detailed 
investigation in Panel A of Table 5 suggests that this result is driven by the two 
groups of firms with bankers on the board. This suggests that a seat on the board 
enables banks to exercise control over a firm’s indebtedness. This evidence is 
consistent with the preference of banks for low risk customers (Carey et al. (1998)) 
(L8b).21 The missing significant relationship between bank debt and leverage for 
NOB and BEQ firms suggests that without a bank representation on the board, the 
bank can only influence a firm’s financing policy by granting or refusing to grant a 
                                                           
21 In 2000, Dutch telecom firm KPN showed details of a credit facility to the Dutch Minister of 
Finance. Because the state owns shares and according to law all shareholders have the right to equal 
information, KPN had to publish the conditions of the bank loan, which would otherwise never been 
revealed. The conditions concern maximum debt amounts, minimum profits and minimum interest 
coverage, which improve over time. Also dividends are forbidden and divestitures and investments 
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loan, but cannot affect the overall debt level. It also provides an additional 
confirmation of the weak position of the shareholders of Dutch firms. More 
specifically, one would expect that banks would have the largest motivation to 
oversee the debt policy of firms in which they have a relatively large stake. A 
potential candidate for such supervision would be BEQ firms that on average have the 
highest leverage and almost three quarters of their debt originates from banks. 
Although the average bank shareholding in this type of firms is the highest (of 14%) 
compared to the rest of the sample, we see no relationships between the leverage and 
bank debt for this sub-sample. This is consistent with the findings of Danisevska et al. 
(2003) that in the Netherlands a supervisory board is effective in the influencing a 
firm’s management, not shareholders.  
Finally, the results for the relationship between the source of debt and its 
maturity are practically unchanged compared to those in Table 3. The effects of bank 
debt in the debt maturity equation are significantly negative for all groups. In the bank 
debt equation, debt maturity has a negative impact on bank debt and this effect is 
significantly different from zero in three out of four sub-samples. In the fourth (BOB) 
sub-sample the coefficient of debt maturity is negative with a t-value of -1.025. This 
provides very strong evidence for both the banks’ specialization in providing short-
term debt and for banks as the exclusive short-term debt source for Dutch firms (M7 
and B3).  
Table 5, Panel B shows results for the control variables in our simultaneous 
equations system that are generally consistent with those reported in Table 3 and 
discussed in the Section 4. In addition, we find that in the sub-sample of firms with 
the strongest ties to banks, future growth opportunities have a significantly positive 
effect on leverage. Given that these firms are rather large mature firms with low 
growth opportunities, it seems that they are prone to overinvestment problems, but 
they avoid disciplining role of the debt. This finding is consistent with the empirical 
finding of De Jong (2002), who shows that Dutch firms that are likely to overinvest 
do not increase their leverage in order to self-restrain themselves. However, we also 
find that free cash flows positively affect leverage, which contrasts with the debt 
avoidance hypothesis. The significantly positive coefficient on firm size is consistent 
with the positive effect of the bankruptcy costs reduction on the optimal leverage. It 
                                                                                                                                                                          
limited (Het Financieele Dagblad, December 4, 2001). This example clearly shows that banks aim to 
reduce future leverage. 
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suggests that large firms, which might be less likely to go bankrupt (e.g. due to better 
diversification), have more debt in the capital structure.  
In the debt maturity equation the asset maturity (M5) remains the most 
prominent determinant of the maturity of debt (controlling for the total level and 
source of debt). In addition, we find that in the sub-sample of firms with a bank 
representation on the board, future growth opportunities have a negative effect on the 
debt maturity that is significant at the 10% level. This is consistent with Myers’ 
(1977) mitigation of underinvestment problems by shortening debt maturity (M4).  
Furthermore, in the bank debt equation BOB firms with lower asset value volatility 
have significantly more bank debt, which further confirms Carey et al. (1998) 
hypothesis that banks prefer to provide loans to low risk customers. The significantly 
negative coefficient on the firm size provides some support that banks can reduce the 
costs of informational problematic borrowers that small firms might be (B4). It is also 
in line with the flotation cost hypothesis, where large firms can afford the large fixed 
part of it and thus rely less on the bank debt (B10). An additional piece of evidence on 
the positive role of a banker on the board comes from the fact that firms with high 
growth opportunities and bankers on the boards have more debt monitored by banks.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
We model the relations among three distinct capital structure choices: leverage, debt 
maturity and the source of debt. Furthermore, we test whether bank involvement 
influences capital structure decisions. We approximate the degree of involvement of a 
bank by the bank’s shareholdings in a firm and its representation on the board. Our 
results emphasize the importance of bank involvement in the capital structure choice. 
We find that bank debt has a negative effect on leverage in firms with bankers on the 
board, while this relation is absent in the firms without bank involvement. This result 
suggests that banks maximize the value of their loans by reducing overall leverage. 
The finding is also consistent with the preference of banks for low risk loans (Carey et 
al. (1998)). We confirm Diamond’s (1991) liquidity risk theory because the absence 
of bank relations increases the effect of leverage on maturity. Bank involvement 
reduces liquidity risk. We find a strong trade-off between bank debt and maturity, 
which is independent of bank involvement. 
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The results in this study stress the costs and benefits of firm-bank relations. 
We study these phenomena in the Dutch setting because we expect that the strong 
position of banks in this country magnify the issues. Potentially, any firm-bank 
relation can be expected to show the mechanisms we have revealed in our study. 
However, in other bank-based systems, such as Germany, we expect the documented 
relations to be most important.  
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Table 1: Theories and determinants 
 
Theories Determinants Hypotheses 
Panel  A: Leverage 
   
Tax effects   
 Marginal tax rate  L1 (+) 
 Non-debt tax shields  L2 (-) 
Bankruptcy costs   
 Collateral value of assets  L3 (+) 
 Probability of bankruptcy  L4 (-) 
Moral hazard   
 Free cash flow  L5 (+) 
 Growth opportunities  L6 (-) 
 Debt maturity  L7a (-) 
 Bank debt  L8a (+) 
Adverse selection   
 Debt maturity L7b (+) 
Specialization in corporate lending market   
 Bank debt  L8b (-) 
   
Panel  B: Debt maturity 
   
Tax effects   
 Term structure of interest rates  M1 (+) 
 Marginal tax rate  M2a (-), M2b (0) 
Asset risk   
 Asset value volatility M3a (-), M3b (+) 
Moral hazard    
 Growth opportunities  M4 (-) 
 Asset maturity  M5 (+) 
 Leverage  M6a (-) 
 Bank debt M7a (-) 
Adverse selection   
 Insider information about firm quality  M8 (-) 
 Risk of liquidation  M9 (non-lin) 
 Leverage M6b (+) 
 Bank debt  M7b (-) 
   
Panel  C: Bank debt 
   
Moral hazard   
 Growth opportunities  B1a (+) 
 Leverage  B2a (+) 
 Debt maturity B3 (-) 
Adverse selection   
 Information asymmetry  B4 (+) 
 Debt maturity  B3 (-) 
Hold-up problem   
 Growth opportunities  B1b (-) 
 Firm’s bargaining power  B5 (+) 
Specialization in corporate lending market   
 Credit quality  B6 (-) 
 Probability of financial distress B7 (+) 
 Liquidation value B8 (+) 
 Interim indicator informativeness B9 (-) 
 Leverage B2b (-) 
Flotation costs   
 Firm size  B10 (-) 
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Table 2: Summary statistics  
Summary statistics for the full sample of firms. The total number of observations is 1205 firm-years for 
205 firms over 1992-2001. The sources of data are annual reports, REACH, Het Financieele Dagblad, 
and Gids bij de Officiële Prijscourant van de Amsterdamse Effectenbeurs.  Leverage is ratio of total 
debt (excluding current liabilities) to the book value total assets. Debt maturity is defined as long-term 
debt over total debt. Bank debt is included as long-term and short-term bank debt over the book value 
of total assets. Firm size is the log of the book value of total assets in thousands of Euros. Collateral is 
ratio of fixed tangible assets and inventory to total assets. Taxation is taxes paid over pre-tax income. 
Non-debt tax shields are defined as operating income, less interest payments and tax payments relative 
to total assets. Volatility in year t is standard deviation of ratio of operating income to total assets over 
the period t-1 to t-5. Tobin’s Q is market value over replacement value of total assets.  Free cash flow 
is operating income, minus taxes, interest expenditures, and dividends over total assets. Term premium 
is the difference between the Dutch IR swap 10 year rate and the Dutch interbank 6 month rate. Asset 
maturity is measured as the book value weighted average of the maturities of current assets and net 
property, plant and equipment, where the maturity of current assets is current assets of cost of goods 
sold and the maturity of fixed tangible assets is measured over annual depreciation expense.  Abnormal 
future earnings in year t are defined as the earnings per share in year t+1 less the earnings per share in 
year t divided by the end of year t share price. Profitability is ratio of operating income to book value of 
total assets. Convertible debt dummy equals one if the firm had in year t outstanding convertible debt 
according to Gids bij de Officiële Prijscourant van de Amsterdamse Effectenbeurs, and zero otherwise. 
Public debt dummy equals one if the firm had in year t outstanding public debt (other than convertible) 
according to Gids bij de Officiële Prijscourant van de Amsterdamse Effectenbeurs, and zero otherwise. 
Bank equity includes stakes above 5%. The number of bankers on the board is the number of 
interlocking directorates between firms in our sample and Dutch banks. Banker on the board dummy 
equals to one, if there is at least one banker on the board and zero otherwise. 
 
 Mean Median Standard deviation 
    
Leverage 0.258 0.242 0.162 
Debt maturity 0.572 0.611 0.295 
Bank debt 0.586 0.673 0.347 
Firm size 12.355 12.292 1.937 
Collateral 0.537 0.573 0.218 
Taxation 0.285 0.305 0.275 
Non-debt tax shields 0.034 0.045 0.117 
Volatility 0.036 0.022 0.048 
Tobin’s Q 1.521 1.213 1.024 
Free cash flow 0.014 0.025 0.113 
Term premium 1.44 1.805 1.134 
Asset maturity 7.284 2.560 74.241 
Abnormal future earnings 0.011 0.011 0.281 
Profitability 0.077 0.087 0.124 
Convertible debt dummy 0.160 0.000 0.360 
Public debt dummy 0.120 0.000 0.320 
Bank equity 7.394 5.040 10.271 
Banker on the board dummy 0.410 0.000 0.490 
No of bankers on the board 0.750 0.000 1.130 
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Table 3: Simultaneity in capital structure - leverage, maturity and bank debt 
Simultaneous equations model, where the endogenous variables are leverage, debt maturity, and bank 
debt. The model is estimated using two stage least squares with Newey-West  HAC standard errors and 
covariances. A constant and fourteen industry dummies are included, though not reported. No public 
debt market access is dummy equals one if the firm does not have any public debt outstanding, zero 
otherwise. High TQ is dummy that equals one if in the given year TQ is larger than the sample median. 
Other variables are defined in Table 1. The total number of observations is 1205. The symbol ‘***’ 
denotes that the estimated coefficient is significant at the 1% level; ‘**’ at the 5% level; ‘*’ at the 10% 
level. 
 
 Leverage Debt maturity Bank debt 
 Coefficient (t-value) Coefficient (t-value) Coefficient (t-value) 
Leverage - 0.521*** (3.936) 0.071        (0.379) 
Debt maturity -0.544** (-1.985) - -0.736*** (-3.796) 
Bank debt -0.408** (-2.457) -0.418*** (-5.918) - 
Firm size 0.009      (1.131) 0.049        (0.683) -0.009      (-0.965) 
Tobin’s Q 0.007      (0.586) 0.005        (0.364) 0.005        (0.747) 
Asset volatility 0.001      (0.004) -0.044       (-0.188) -0.200       (-0.704) 
Collateral 0.469*** (4.008) - 0.323*** (2.866) 
Taxation -0.046**   (-1.972) -0.010      (-0.337) - 
Non-debt tax shields -1.966*** (-2.669) - - 
Free cash flows 1.774**    (2.359) - - 
Term premium - -0.005       (-0.869) - 
Asset maturity - 0.0003*** (4.101) - 
Abnormal future earnings - 0.002         (0.967) - 
Firm size squared - -0.002       (-0.633) - 
Profitability - - -0.075    (-0.852) 
No public debt market access - - 0.202*** (3.975) 
(High TQ)* no public debt - - -0.025     (-0.652) 
Banker on the board dummy - - -0.086**  (-2.167) 
(High TQ)* banker dummy - - 0.066       (1.569) 
Bank shareholding - - 0.002       (1.581) 
(High TQ)* bank shareholding - - -0.0002  (-0.159) 
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Figure 1: The estimated relationships between leverage, debt maturity and bank 
debt        
     Leverage 
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Table 4: The comparison of means between the four groups based on the extent of bank involvement 
 
Group 1 consists of 358 firm-year observations with no bank equity and no banker on the board. Group 2 consists of 351 firm year observation with bank equity, but no 
banker on the board. Group 3 has 192 firm-year observations with no bank equity, only banker on the board. Group 4 includes 304 firm-year observations with both bank 
equity and banker on the board. All variables are defined in Table 1. The first four columns show means per group. The last six columns provide probabilities of the equal 
mean test between two groups. The results for Tobin’s Q are year independent. N.a. in case of mean test denotes that the test statistic could not be computed because the 
standard deviation within both groups is 0. 
 
 Mean per group Significances of the equal mean test 
 1 2 3 4 1 vs 2 1 vs 3 1 vs 4 2 vs 3 2 vs 4 3 vs 4 
           
Bank equity 0.000 14.155 0.000 12.963 0.000 n.a. 0.000 0.000 0.146 0.000 
No of bankers on the board 0.000 0.000 1.830 1.800 n.a. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.708 
Leverage 0.246 0.295 0.217 0.257 0.000 0.051 0.372 0.000 0.002 0.004 
Debt maturity 0.556 0.481 0.643 0.652 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.702 
Bank debt 0.626 0.730 0.438 0.468 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.328 
Firm size 11.397 11.553 13.729 13.540 0.186 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.229 
Collateral 0.516 0.590 0.543 0.499 0.000 0.191 0.364 0.006 0.000 0.023 
Taxation 0.273 0.280 0.280 0.309 0.745 0.799 0.141 0.995 0.120 0.184 
Non-debt tax shields 0.012 0.039 0.047 0.047 0.015 0.018 0.003 0.144 0.059 0.963 
Volatility 0.056 0.035 0.026 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.024 
Tobin’s Q 1.760 1.381 1.616 1.343 0.000 0.204 0.000 0.003 0.512 0.000 
Free cash flow -0.007 0.021 0.025 0.024 0.011 0.027 0.007 0.358 0.357 0.772 
Asset maturity 13.865 5.691 3.725 3.620 0.261 0.299 0.187 0.077 0.022 0.784 
Abnormal future earnings 0.011 0.011 0.029 0.000 0.990 0.485 0.559 0.511 0.600 0.024 
Profitability 0.054 0.084 0.088 0.091 0.010 0.024 0.002 0.535 0.784 0.628 
Convertible debt dummy 0.092 0.130 0.160 0.260 0.079 0.025 0.000 0.476 0.000 0.007 
Public debt dummy 0.031 0.026 0.240 0.250 0.683 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.832 
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Table 5: The effects of differing bank involvement on the simultaneity in capital 
structure choices  
 
Simultaneous equations model, where the endogenous variables are leverage, debt maturity, and bank 
debt. The model is estimated using two stage least squares with Newey-West  HAC standard errors and 
covariances. A constant and fourteen industry dummies are included, though not reported. D_NOB 
equals to one if firm neither has bank equity nor banker on the board, zero otherwise. D_ BEQ equals 
to one if firm has bank equity, but no banker on the board, zero otherwise. D_ BOB equals to one if 
firm has no bank equity, only banker(s) on the board, zero otherwise. D_ BOBEQ equals to one if firm 
has both bank equity and banker(s) on the board, zero otherwise. Variables are defined in Table 1 and 
Table 2. The total number of observations is 1205. The symbol ‘***’ denotes that the estimated 
coefficient is significant at the 1% level; ‘**’ at the 5% level; ‘*’ at the 10% level. 
 
 Leverage Debt maturity Bank debt 
 Coefficient (t-value) Coefficient (t-value) Coefficient (t-value) 
Panel A: Endogenous variables 
Leverage * d_NOB - 0.709*** (3.498) 0.007      (0.021) 
Leverage * d_BEQ - 0.570*** (3.724) 0.185      (0.861) 
Leverage * d_BOB - 0.386**   (2.154) -0.351   (-1.144) 
Leverage * d_BOBEQ - 0.141       (0.884) 0.114      (0.384) 
Debt maturity * d_ NOB -0.093   (-1.004) - -0.499*** (-3.443) 
Debt maturity * d_ BEQ 0.135   (1.368) - -0.365**   (-2.088) 
Debt maturity * d_ BOB -0.016   (-0.171) - -0.245       (-1.025) 
Debt maturity * d_ BOBEQ -0.040   (-0.395) - -0.541**   (-2.183) 
Bank debt * d_ NOB -0.0004     (-0.005) -0.500*** (-5.005) - 
Bank debt * d_ BEQ -0.107       (-1.394) -0.566*** (-6.048) - 
Bank debt * d_ BOB -0.184*** (-3.011) -0.219**   (-2.250) - 
Bank debt * d_ BOBEQ -0.158**   (-2.244) -0.390*** (-4.580) - 
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Table 5: The effects of differing bank involvement on the simultaneity in capital 
structure choices (continued) 
 
 
 Leverage Debt maturity Bank debt 
 Coefficient (t-value) Coefficient (t-value) Coefficient (t-value) 
Panel B: Control variables 
Firm size 0.011**   (2.128) 0.036       (0.482) -0.017*   (-1.831) 
Tobin’s Q 0.002       (0.227) -0.004       (-0.306) 0.004      (0.284) 
   Tobin’s Q * d_ BEQ 0.015        (0.705) 0.026      (1.238) - 
   Tobin’s Q * d_ BOB 0.020        (1.327) -0.038*    (-1.761) - 
   Tobin’s Q * d_ BOBEQ 0.110*** (4.155) 0.052      (1.250) - 
Asset volatility 0.066       (0.490) 0.008      (0.035) -0.041    (-0.117) 
   Asset volatility * d_ BEQ - - 0.553     (0.864) 
   Asset volatility * d_ BOB  - - -2.636** (-2.455) 
   Asset volatility * d_ BOBEQ - - 0.022      (0.014) 
Collateral 0.281*** (5.231) - 0.367**   (2.400) 
   Collateral * d_ BEQ - - -0.149  (-0.860) 
   Collateral * d_ BOB - - -0.349   (-1.322) 
   Collateral * d_ BOBEQ - - -0.190   (-1.001) 
Taxation -0.033      (-1.563) -0.017     (-0.540) - 
Non-debt tax shields -0.994**  (-2.340) - - 
   Non-debt tax shields * d_ BEQ -2.583*** (-3.231) - - 
   Non-debt tax shields * d_ BOB -1.748        (-1.602) - - 
   Non-debt tax shields * d_ BOBEQ -1.971*** (-2.591) - - 
Free cash flows 0.890**   (2.058) - - 
   Free cash flows * d_ BEQ 2.380**   (2.504) - - 
   Free cash flows * d_ BOB 1.271       (1.080) - - 
   Free cash flows * d_ BOBEQ 0.160       (0.220) - - 
Term premium - -0.008      (-1.211) - 
Asset maturity - 0.0003*** (6.193) - 
   Asset maturity * d_ BEQ - 0.003       (1.291) - 
   Asset maturity * d_ BOB - 0.005       (0.659) - 
   Asset maturity * d_ BOBEQ - 0.007*** (2.837) - 
Abnormal future earnings - -0.008      (-0.194) - 
Firm size squared - -0.001      (-0.463) - 
Profitability - - -0.052     (-0.562) 
No public debt market access - - 0.249*** (5.761) 
(High TQ)* no public debt - - -0.043     (-1.216) 
Banker on the board dummy - - 0.070       (0.531) 
(High TQ)* banker dummy - - 0.069*     (1.707) 
Bank shareholding - - 0.0007     (0.517) 
(High TQ)* bank shareholding - - -0.0003   (-0.209) 
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Figure 2: The estimated relationships between leverage, debt maturity and bank 
debt in the four groups depending on the extent of the bank involvement 
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